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DUSTIN CRUMMETT, University of Notre Dame
This book is about the normative impact of God’s existence (the “axiology 
of theism”). It’s specifically about pro-theists, who, roughly, think God’s 
existence would be welcome, and anti-theists, who think otherwise. The 
sides wind up being more complex than this quick gloss suggests: for in-
stance, one might think God’s existence would increase the value of the 
world (“impersonal pro-theism”) while still being bad for the people in it, 
or at least some of the people in it (“personal anti-theism”). The book is 
good, and apart from Hud Hudson’s A Grotesque in the Garden, I think it’s 
the only book in analytic philosophy devoted to this important question. 
I expect the axiology of theism to receive more attention in coming years, 
and this book will be a landmark in the expanding literature. In the inter-
est of advancing the debate myself, I’ll focus largely on providing critical 
comments, but these shouldn’t overshadow this assessment.
The book contains eleven chapters by thirteen authors. Klaas Kraay’s 
extremely helpful introduction aims not only at summarizing the other 
chapters but also at clarifying the question under discussion, noting some 
of the methodological issues which arise in answering it, mapping pos-
sible views one might take towards it, etc. The other pieces are divided 
into three sections: one on pro-theism, one on anti-theism, and one on 
“connections between the existential and axiological debates,” i.e., con-
nections between the axiology of theism and the question of whether or 
not God actually exists. I expect that many readers will (like me) initially 
be skeptical of anti-theism. So, I’ll begin by discussing the anti-theistic 
arguments and will spend the most time on them.
Guy Kahane touched off the debate around the axiology of theism 
with his 2011 paper “Should We Want God to Exist?” Here, he argues that 
God’s existence has certain inescapable drawbacks for us, while the main 
benefits of theism for us could, in principle, be obtained without God ex-
isting. This means that some atheistic worlds are preferable for us over 
any theistic worlds. (He thinks they might be preferable for us even if, due 
to the value of God’s existence, impersonal pro-theism is true.)
Kahane thinks the main benefits of theism will include things like 
blissful immortality and post-mortem justice. He notes that these things 
might obtain even if God doesn’t exist (e.g., through karma). Of course, 
theists might say that God makes available to us at least one benefit which 
couldn’t obtain in any atheistic world: namely, relationship with an abso-
lutely perfect being. Kahane’s response is to note that “I don’t myself find 
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the idea of such a relationship with a supreme being so appealing” (105) 
and that he doesn’t expect other atheists to, either. Perhaps neither side is 
likely to convince the other. But Kahane does bring out an important les-
son: to vindicate a pro-theism worth having, pro-theists may need to focus 
on goods which are essentially related to God, not merely various extrinsic 
goods which, in principle, might be obtained without God.
Meanwhile, Kahane’s catalog of theistic drawbacks centers around the 
fact that in a theistic world, “we necessarily occupy a subordinate posi-
tion in relation to a being that is vastly superior to us in every respect” 
(110). Resultant alleged problems include the fact that God would con-
tinually violate our privacy, that we would have to conform our lives to 
God’s will and thereby “severely constrain our ability to live our lives ac-
cording to our own plan,” and that we would wind up “fairly low in the 
cosmic moral hierarchy,” obligated to obey and worship God, and thus 
placed in a “deeply undignified” position (110–111). Kahane’s argument 
for the badness of all this rests partly on an analogy with inegalitarian so-
cial relations between humans, such as those between slaves and masters 
(112–113). I share Kahane’s socio-political judgments. But I think much of 
the reason why inegalitarian relations are unattractive among us rests on 
the moral equality which we share with each other (and, I think, with the 
other sentient animals) and which makes such relations inappropriate. I 
worry that regretting standing in such a hierarchy with someone who re-
ally is inherently superior to us evinces the kind of envy which egalitarian 
philosophers have rightly rejected as the basis for their views (cf. Elizabeth 
Anderson, “The Fundamental Disagreement Between Luck Egalitarians 
and Relational Egalitarians,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary 
vol. 36 [2012]: 1–23; Dustin Crummett, “Introduction to the Left,” in Ethics, 
Left and Right: The Moral Issues that Divide Us, edited by Bob Fischer [Oxford 
University Press, forthcoming]).
(I’ll note that Kahane’s chapter might also have indirect implications for 
the problem of divine hiddenness. Even among people who want God to 
exist, knowledge of God might not serve God’s purposes, if they want theism 
to be true only for extrinsic reasons and otherwise regard it as regrettable.)
Next, Stephen Maitzen argues that theism limits human inquiry, so that 
epistemic values support anti-theism. There are two stages. The first criti-
cizes the claim that atheism would prevent our obtaining knowledge of 
the world. I question the choice of targets here. For instance, several pages 
are devoted to an obscure argument about the necessity of faith from the 
theologian R. M. Burns, while Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against 
naturalism (EAAN) gets only one footnote, and Maitzen’s only response 
is to cite the 2002 volume Naturalism Defeated. But the EAAN has been 
refined, and new spin-off versions (such as ones focusing specifically on 
moral or metaphysical knowledge) have been created, since then.
The second part argues that theism places limits on the scope of human 
knowledge. Any worldview which makes certain purposes fundamental, 
rather than reducible to something non-teleological, involves “genuine 
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magic” (139). On naturalism, “any purpose has a purposeless, purely 
mechanistic explanation,” which allows “human discovery to be limitless 
in depth.” But on theism, intentional action sometimes achieves effects 
without any mechanism (e.g., God decides there will be light, and there 
is). Accordingly, when God produces an effect, there’s “no way it occurs,” 
and thus “no mechanism . . . that we could scrutinize ever more deeply” 
(140). So, on theism but not naturalism, some of the most important occur-
rences will be such that we cannot investigate how they happened.
I’m unconvinced. That an omnipotent being decides to bring some-
thing about is arguably a more intelligible explanation than any mecha-
nistic one: the decision of the omnipotent being entails the effect, whereas, 
post-Hume, it seems mysterious why any mechanism causes the effects it 
does rather than any other, or none at all (Alvin Plantinga, “Laws, Cause, 
and Occasionalism,” in Reason and Faith: Themes from Richard Swinburne, 
edited by Michael Bergmann and Jeff Brower [Oxford University Press, 
2016], 126–144). Further, mechanisms run out at some point anyway. Plau-
sibly, there are no mechanisms at the level of the fundamental particles; 
they just do their thing. So, ultimately all physical processes rest on events 
which are such that there is no way they come about. So, it seems to me 
that human inquiry can’t really be “limitless in depth” by Maitzen’s own 
standard.
In his chapter, Erik Wielenberg argues that life in a Christian universe 
is absurd, in that it would be impossible for most humans to be happy 
if they understood and accepted its entailments. He thinks Christian-
ity makes life absurd because it entails what I elsewhere (2017) called a 
“strong sufferer-centered requirement on theodicy,” i.e., it entails that 
God would not allow an undeserved, involuntarily undergone evil to be-
fall someone unless it ultimately benefited them. Since any (undeserved, 
etc.) evil will benefit its sufferer, this gives us a reason to inflict suffering 
on others, which Wielenberg expects to have devastating psychological 
consequences. As he formalizes the argument:
1. Necessarily, if God exists, then whenever a person P experiences unde-
served involuntary suffering, P is better off overall than P would have 
been without the suffering.
2. So: Necessarily, if God exists, then whenever a person A causes another 
person B to experience undeserved involuntary suffering, B is better off 
overall than B would have been without the suffering (from 1).
3. God’s existence makes it true (or would make it true) that each of us is 
morally obligated to pursue the good of others.
4. Necessarily, if (i) A is morally obligated to pursue B’s good and (ii) A’s 
performing act X would make B better off overall, then (iii) A has a fact-
relative reason to perform X.
5. So, God’s existence makes it true (or would make it true) that C: each of 
us has a fact-relative reason to cause others to experience undeserved 
involuntary suffering (from 2, 3 and 4).
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6. Most human beings are such that if they were to accept (C), they would 
experience negative psychological consequences that would make it dif-
ficult or impossible for them to be happy (without also failing to accept 
at least one entailment of (C)).
7. Therefore, the claim that God exists makes life absurd (from 5 and 6). 
(149–150)
I’ve also argued that the strong requirement has untoward moral im-
plications, though ones somewhat different than those envisioned by 
Wielenberg (“Sufferer-Centered Requirements on Theodicy and All-
Things-Considered Harms,” Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 8 
[2017]: 71–95). So I’m sympathetic to parts of the general approach. But I 
have three objections to the argument as given here.
First, assuming a charitable interpretation of the strong sufferer-cen-
tered requirement, I doubt it entails that there’s any reason to inflict suf-
fering. For all it says, God might ensure that you suffer any time it will 
benefit you, regardless of what other agents do. (If they don’t hurt you, 
maybe you suffer some natural evil.) It’s then false that my victim would 
be worse off without my action, since they would have experienced other, 
equally efficacious suffering without it.
Second, the mere existence of a reason to do something isn’t disturbing. 
That eating the people who pass by my house would provide me with a 
free source of complete protein is a reason to do it. But distress only comes 
when we think we have all-things-considered reason to do something. And 
it often happens that we would wrong someone through actions which 
benefit them, and therefore should not, all-things-considered, do the ben-
eficial thing. (E.g., suppose someone has the right to know a painful truth, 
and the attendant pain will be non-voluntary since there is no way to get 
their consent to the pain without revealing the truth to them. Suppose 
lying is the only way to spare them, because they’ll figure it out if we pre-
varicate. It might be wrong to lie to them, even if it’s what’s best for them.)
Why think (1) will ever result in our having all-things-considered reason 
to inflict suffering? Wielenberg (153) claims the “weightiness” of the rea-
son means people will “often be forced to conclude that they have an ac-
tual moral obligation to inflict the suffering.” But there are some weighty 
reasons which I am never obligated to act on—even obligated to never 
act on. Killing a random child would prevent the suffering of a lifetime’s 
worth of pain and the commission of a lifetime’s worth of wrongful acts, 
but it would be wrong on balance. Wielenberg elsewhere (161n11) sug-
gests that God’s forbidding us from inflicting beneficial suffering would 
introduce “incoherence (or at least oddness)” into Christian ethics, given 
the significance which Christian ethics places on beneficence. But I don’t 
see why this is more odd than the fact that ordinary secular morality al-
ready prevents us from taking various beneficent courses of action, de-
spite placing great significance on beneficence. I’m not sure that these 
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worries are conclusive, but I think this part of the argument needs further 
development.
The third, and from my perspective most significant, problem is that, 
as I’ve argued elsewhere, there’s not much reason for a theist to accept the 
strong requirement to begin with. There are ways of respecting the anti-
consequentialist motivations behind the strong requirement while avoid-
ing its problems (Dustin Crummett, “Sufferer-Centered Requirements on 
Theodicy and All-Things-Considered Harms,” Oxford Studies in Philosophy 
of Religion 8 [2017]: 71–95; Rebecca Chan and Dustin Crummett, “Moral 
Indulgences: When Offsetting is Wrong,” Oxford Studies in Philosophy of 
Religion [forthcoming]). And as far as I know, it’s not an entailment of any 
commonly accepted ethical theory. (Wielenberg [150] cites an argument 
from Stephen Maitzen in “Ordinary Morality Implies Atheism,” European 
Journal for Philosophy of Religion 2 [2009]: 107–126) claiming that allowing 
someone to suffer for reasons other than their own benefit would treat 
them as a mere means. But it might be that my suffering is not a means, 
but rather a foreseen side-effect, of something that benefits someone else.)
Final in the anti-theist section, Toby Betenson argues that impersonal 
anti-theism is implausible. But he also argues that what’s rationally pref-
erable for an agent sometimes comes apart from what would maximize 
the world’s value, so that there’s still room for personal anti-theism. This 
seems basically right.
Turning to the pro-theists: Scott Davison draws on his own account of 
intrinsic value to argue that God would have great intrinsic value. This is 
plausible, though I would have benefited from a clearer sense of Davison’s 
target: anti-theists generally grant that God would possess great intrinsic 
value, but think theism would be regrettable for some other reason.
Michael Tooley’s rich chapter covers a wide range of topics. He thinks 
the case for impersonal pro-theism is strong, but stronger from the per-
spective of an atheist than a theist. After all, it’s open to an atheist, but not 
a theist, to say that the existence of God would result in a better world 
than the one we actually live in. Tooley also argues for the claims that 
the existence of God would not make the world worse in any respect 
and would not make anyone’s life worse. However, he thinks defending 
these may require rethinking some of the characteristics usually assigned 
to God. For instance, Tooley is sympathetic to Kahane’s claim that there 
would be something intrusive about God’s knowing all our thoughts. But 
this should just lead us to conclude that God probably wouldn’t be om-
niscient: God would only learn our thoughts when there was some over-
riding reason for doing so. Obviously, Tooley’s arguments contain some 
controversial moves (e.g., he has to argue that God would not be neces-
sarily omniscient), but there’s much to think about even for those who 
disagree with many of Tooley’s claims.
Finally, T. J. Mawson’s chapter deals largely with the question of how 
to determine which is the closest (im)possible world in which the answer 
to the question of God’s existence is different than it actually is. Mawson 
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winds up defending the claim that both theists and atheists should agree 
that God’s existence does/would make the world no worse, and maybe at 
least somewhat better.
In the third section of the book, J. L. Schellenberg claims that “religious” 
forms of theism must portray God as axiologically and soteriologically 
“ultimate” in a way which implies that “God’s existence . . . could not in 
any relevant way make a world or this world or someone’s world—the 
world of someone’s personal experience—worse than it would be if natu-
ralism were true in this world” (183). (I wasn’t sure about the argument for 
these assertions. Schellenberg [183] thinks they constitute a “‘grammati-
cal’ claim about theistic religion,” but this isn’t evident to me.) This might 
provide a new argument from anti-theism to atheism, but Schellenberg 
concludes that such an argument will ultimately be parasitic upon the 
problem of evil.
In their chapter, Myron Penner and Ben Arbour make an argument 
similar to one made by Tooley. They think one can be an anti-theist or a 
proponent of the argument from evil, but probably not both: if God’s ex-
istence would prevent the occurrence of large amounts of gratuitous evil, 
this would plausibly outweigh any negative consequences, such as loss of 
autonomy, pointed to by anti-theists.
Finally, Richard B. Davis and W. Paul Franks argue that Plantinga’s 
free will defense is incompatible with his felix culpa theodicy. The free will 
defense posits that all creaturely essences might suffer from transworld 
depravity. However, Jesus has a creaturely essence, and therefore would 
himself suffer from transworld depravity, leaving him unable to do the 
atoning work posited by the felix culpa theodicy. I’d have preferred more 
discussion of the upshot of this. For instance, would we lose anything if 
we just modified the free will defense to claim that all creaturely essences 
except Jesus’s are transworld depraved? That might be odd or ad hoc, but 
so was the original claim about transworld depravity, and all we need is 
logical possibility.
I’ll close with a methodological note. The authors in this book approach 
the axiology of theism in the usual analytic way, as a matter for dispas-
sionate analysis. (By contrast, Hudson’s Grotesque certainly doesn’t do this.) 
That’s how I usually approach things, too, so I was surprised that I felt 
conflicted about it here. There’s a general question about whether certain 
questions in philosophy concern issues which are so important or sensi-
tive or sacred that it’s somehow inappropriate to treat them in the usual 
analytic way. I wonder if, from the theistic and particularly the Christian 
perspective, this might be one of them. From that perspective, at least 
certain forms of anti-theism could be regarded as gravely dangerous and 
disrespectful—perhaps even, in a certain sense, demonic. Kahane himself 
thinks his conclusions are “blasphemous” if theism is true (122). And 
while he grants that servility to God “would, I assume, be appropriate” 
(113), and so wouldn’t endorse Satanic rebellion, his reasons for finding 
theism unattractive are basically those traditionally attributed to Satan, 
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and parts of his chapter would be thematically at home in Book II of Para-
dise Lost. How, morally, should a Christian respond to a view like this? I’m 
not sure. Maybe the usual analytic approach is enough. But I found myself 
hoping that, as the literature on the axiology of theism expands, part of 
it will address the research ethics appropriate to the investigation. (I’m 
grateful to Liz Jackson for comments on an earlier version of this review.)
Faith and Humility , by Jonathan Kvanvig. Oxford University Press, 2018. 
Pp. viii + 219. $60.00 (hardcover).
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In Faith and Humility, Jonathan Kvanvig argues for an account of two vir-
tues that balance, or provide correction for, each other: faith and humility. 
Faith is the disposition to act in service of an ideal, a disposition that re-
mains despite difficulties or setbacks. One can, however, pursue distorted 
ideals or pursue them in the wrong way—with unquestioning zeal, for 
example. Humility, which helps to correct this extreme, is the disposition 
to attend to the value of one’s aims and the extent of one’s contribution 
toward accomplishing them. To establish these accounts, Kvanvig first 
argues for a method that directs his arguments, and he then develops the 
accounts as he articulates and responds to alternative views. In what fol-
lows, instead of summarizing the book chapter by chapter, I provide a 
summary of Kvanvig’s positions and his arguments for them as they are 
eventually developed throughout the book.
In the first three-quarters of the book, Kvanvig gives an account of faith. 
His aim is to provide an account that applies across both religious and 
non-religious contexts by searching for faith worth having, employing an 
axiomatic approach rather than engaging in linguistic analysis, etymol-
ogy, or an effort to discover the fundamental components of the world. 
The axiomatic approach, says Kvanvig, is what makes philosophy worth 
doing: “We can engage philosophically in an analysis of anything in the 
dictionary, but we don’t, and the reason we don’t, when it is justifying of 
our practice, is because we presuppose the value or importance or signifi-
cance of what we focus on in our philosophical explorations” (25).
In the search for faith worth having, Kvanvig assumes that faith is a 
virtue, a trait of character that is characterized functionally, and asks what 
this trait is for, or why it is worth having. His answer is that faith pro-
vides structural unity to a life. Lives of faith are contrasted with lives that 
are wantonly disconnected, “just one damn thing after another” (16), or 
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